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HIP AA-cracy 
by Carl E. Schneider 
T he Department of Health and Human Services has recently 
been exercising its authority 
under the (wittily named) "administra-
tive simplification" part of the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountabili-
ty Act to regulate the confidentiality of 
medical records. I love the goal; I loathe 
the means. The benefits are obscure; the 
costs are onerous. Putatively, the regula-
tions protect my autonomy; practically, 
they ensnarl me in red tape and hijack 
my money for services I dislike. 
HIPAA (a misnomer-HIPAA is the 
statute, not the regulations) is too 
lengthy, labile, complex, confused, un-
finished, and unclear to be summarized 
intelligibly or reliably. (Brevis esse laboro, 
obscurus flo.) However, a covered entity 
is any health plan or "health care 
provider" that "transmits any health in-
formation in electronic form." If 
HIPAA has a general rule, it is that (1) a 
"covered entity may not use or disclose 
protected health information except as 
permitted," (2) the entity must "make 
reasonable efforts to limit protected 
health information to the minimum 
necessary," and (3) the covered entity 
must require its "business associates" to 
"appropriately safeguard the informa-
tion." With plentiful exceptions and re-
strictions, entities may use or disclose 
information "for treatment, payment, 
or health care operations." 
There is much more. For instance: 
(1) Information may usually be dis-
closed for "marketing" only with the pa-
tient's elaborately detailed authoriza-
tion. (2) An entity may reveal a patient's 
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name, room, and general condition to 
"persons who ask for the individual by 
name" but "must inform an individual 
of the protected health information that 
it may include in a directory and the 
persons to whom it may disclose such 
information ... and provide the indi-
vidual with the opportunity to restrict" 
the disclosures. (3) Entities may release 
information with the patient's consent. 
If a patient cannot give consent, the 
"entity may, in the exercise of its profes-
sional judgment, determine whether ... 
disclosure [to a person taking care of the 
patient] is in the best interests of the in-
dividual and, if so, disclose only the . . . 
information that is directly relevant to 
the person's involvement with the indi-
vidual's health care." 
Almost every part of HIPAA in-
structs the entity to loose rivers of infor-
mation upon the patient. Entities may 
do many things without consent, but 
they must specify these things at pun-
ishing length. One example: the notice 
must describe each purpose "for which 
the covered entity is permitted or re-
quired ... to use or disclose protected 
health information without the individ-
ual's written authorization." This "de-
scription must include sufficient detail 
to place the individual on notice of the 
uses and disclosures that are permitted 
or required by this subpart and other 
applicable law." Entities may do many 
things only with consent, which must 
be solicited through another grueling 
barrage of disclosures. 
Why HIPAA? Medical privacy was 
multiply protected-by ethical codes, 
state and federal statutes and adminis-
trative regulations, tort law (which, un-
like HIPAA, give patients remedies), ac-
crediting organizations, hospital poli-
cies, even the market-long before 
HIPAA gleamed in a bureaucrat's eye. 
As Richard Epstein notes, before 
HIPAA we saw no "explosion of im-
proper disclosures of sensitive informa-
tion, and no systematic unwillingness to 
deal with the problems that do arise by 
private organizations or even by more 
limited and focused regulatory respons-
, 
es. 
So why HIPAA? HHS presented and 
justified its basic rules in 400 large pages 
of small print. First: "Privacy is a funda-
mental right .... [l]t speaks to our indi-
vidual and collective freedom." This 
makes me reach for my Burke. He 
could not praise "anything which relates 
to human actions ... on a simple view 
of the object . . . in all the nakedness 
and solitude of metaphysical abstrac-
tion. Circumstances (which with some 
gentlemen pass for nothing) give in real-
ity to every political principle its distin-
guishing color and discriminating ef-
fect." 
"Privacy" means everything and 
nothing. In law, "privacy" is so protean 
that it is meaningless without modifica-
tion. Privacy as "fundamental right" is 
an idea from constitutional law, but it 
refers to freedom of choice, not confi-
dentiality of information. The Consti-
tution protects physical privacy only 
sporadically; for example, only some 
searches are prohibited. More broadly, I 
doubt that the interests protected by 
"privacy" are distinctive or illuminating 
enough to make up an independent 
moral category. 
And fundamental? Complete privacy 
is impossible even for a hermit and un-
healthy for anyone. Every day we trade 
privacy for the many things we value 
more. Privacy itself has costs for individ-
uals and society, as when it makes illness 
embarrassing. Finally, many invasions of 
medical privacy are unfortunate and 
wrong but not greatly damaging. When 
they are damaging, it is often the misuse 
of the information by a third party, not 
the breach of privacy itself, that causes 
the harm. 
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HHS's rationale for HIPAA quickly 
descends from the loftily vague to the 
absurdly narrow: "The health insurance 
claims forms of thousands of patients 
blew out of a truck on its way to a recy-
cling center .... " ''An employee of the 
Tampa, Florida health department took 
a computer disk containing the names 
of 4,000 people who had tested positive 
for HIY. ... " Sad stories, but HIPAA 
cannot prevent winds from blowing nor 
employees ftom stealing, and state law 
already provides sanctions for negligence 
and theft. 
HHS concedes that the "costs and 
benefits of a regulation must, of course, 
be considered as a means of identifYing 
and weighing options." Does HHS be-
lieve this? In the same paragraph it 
warns cryptically that because privacy is 
a "fundamental right . . . it must be 
viewed differently from any ordinary 
economic good." 
However "fundamental" privacy may 
be, HIPAA is otiose if it promotes it in-
effectively. Some privacy is unattainable; 
HIPAA can do little to reduce the num-
ber of people who need to see medical 
records. Other kinds of privacy cannot 
be achieved with HIPAA's tools. Con-
sider HIPAA's incessant disclosure re-
quirements. My hospital distributes 
seven pages of disclosures in print so 
small I can't read them with my glasses 
on. One analysis placed these forms at a 
college reading level. Like this: 
Examples of these activities include 
obtaining accreditation from inde-
pendent organizations like the Joint 
Commission for the Accreditation 
of Healthcare Organizations, the 
National Committee for Quality 
Assurance and others, outcomes 
evaluation and development of clin-
ical guidelines, operation of preven-
tive health, early detection and dis-
ease management programs, case 
management and care coordination, 
contacting of health care providers 
and patients with information 
about treatment alternatives, and 
related functions; evaluations of 
health care providers (credentialing 
and peer review activities) and 
health plans; operation of educa-
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tional programs; underwriting, pre-
mium rating and other activities re-
lating to the creation, renewal or re-
placement of health benefits con-
tracts; obtaining reinsurance, stop-
loss and excess loss insurance; con-
ducting or arranging for medical re-
view, legal services, and auditing 
functions, including fraud and 
abuse detection and compliance 
programs; business planning and 
development; and business manage-
ment and general administrative ac-
tivities, including data and informa-
tion systems management, cus-
tomer service, resolution of internal 
grievances, and sales, mergers, 
transfers, or consolidations with 
other providers or health plans or 
prospective providers or health 
plans. 
But what does the language matter, 
since no one reads the forms? One "cov-
ered entity'' told me that in three years I 
was the second patient to ask for a copy 
of his HIP AA disclosure form. 
Nor is any benefit to confidentiality 
worth any cost. Consider HIPAA's 
record-keeping requirements. One com-
pels entities to offer patients "an ac-
counting of disclosures of protected 
health information made . . . in the six 
years prior" to the request. The account-
ing must include the disclosure's date, 
the disclosee's name and address, a de-
scription of information disclosed, and 
the reason for the disclosure. The cost of 
keeping so many records in such detail 
for so long cannot be small; the people 
who will request, receive, and benefit 
from the information must be few. Have 
we no better uses for resources? 
Not only does HIPAA impose ex-
travagant costs for exiguous benefits. 
HIPAA's sour assumptions about 
human nature work positive harm. For 
instance, HIPAA assumes people (1) 
want to keep information from their 
families and (2) do not want to partici-
pate in research, even medical records 
research whose benefits can be great and 
whose threat to privacy tiny. HIPAA's 
rules are structured to serve patients 
who fit those assumptions. 
HIPAA's assumptions are wrong. 
Most people want their families in-
volved in their medical care. And in one 
study, 96 percent of the Mayo Clinic pa-
tients approached consented to medical 
records research. Instead of having the 
few patients who fit HIPAA's assump-
tions opt in to restrictive privacy rules, 
HHS requires the huge majority of pa-
tients who don't fit the assumptions to 
opt out of them. This burdens patients. 
Worse, most patients won't realize they 
need to act, and few will get around to 
it. 
Most patients, then, will at least be 
harassed, and their preferences will regu-
larly be thwarted. Patients who would 
cheerfully have acceded to medical 
records research may not suffer, but a 
crucial kind of research will (to say 
nothing of HIPAA's effect on research 
generally, a disturbing problem I lack 
space to consider). Patients who want 
families involved in their care may di-
rectly be harmed, for families are often 
denied information patients want them 
to have. Thus prudent patients are sad-
dled with one more chore-having a 
lawyer draft a HIPAA release form. 
The best defense of HIPAA I hear is 
that, favorably interpreted, it might not 
require entities to make overlong disclo-
sures, deny families information, or 
thwart research. But pity the entities. 
HIP AA speaks in sweeping, vague, and 
menacing language. Terms like "reason-
able," "minimum necessary," "profes-
sional judgment," and "best interest" lit-
ter it. It deploys civil and criminal penal-
ties. Recall the unspeakable sentence I 
quoted. You might speak unspeakably 
too in order to provide descriptions with 
"sufficient detail to place the individual 
on notice of the uses and disclosures 
that are permitted or required by this 
subpart and other applicable law." Sure-
ly cautious entities will tell patients too 
much, and everyone else too little. 
So I reach again for my Burke. "The 
science of constructing a common-
wealth, or renovating it, or reforming it, 
is . . . not to be taught a priori 
... , [for] very plausible schemes, with 
very pleasing commencements, have 
often shameful and lamentable conclu-
. " stons. 
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